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E.H. Gombrich. The Sense of Order: A Study in the
Psychology of Decorative Art. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1979. 411 pp., illustrations. $38.50.
Reviewed by D.N. Perkins
Project Zero, Harvard University
The Sense of Order and the Perils of Explanation 1
Would Martians have wallpaper? Perhaps they would,
according to the deliberations of E. H. Gombrich in his
intellectually and visually impressive new book, The
Sense of Order: A Study in the Psychology of Decorative Art. Not that Gombrich ever writes about Martians.
His explicit concern is with the human perceiver and
maker of decorative design. Nonetheless, if we read
Gombrich for his essential logic rather than only his
earthbound subject, he seems to say something about
Martians, too.
The first thing to be understood is that The Sense of
Order undertakes several missions at once. It gives us
a history of attitudes toward ornament, documenting
many degrees of approbation and condemnation up to
the severe verdict of Alfred Laos, who, in a 1908 essay, damned ornament as primitive, criminal, and degenerate and urged that functionalism govern appearance. The Sense of Order provides a tour of the variety
of decoration, ranging from the simple and subtle
statement of a Japanese bowl to the numbing intricacy
of the Alhambra. The book samples the history of ornamentation, tracking the evolution of ornamental motifs; for example, the survival and spread of the modeled face of a lion with a ring in its mouth 2500 years
ago in the mind of a Greek artist. Whatever the theme,
the points are profusely illustrated by photographs and
drawings in the text, an extensive section of larger
black-and-white photographs, and a number of color
plates. Gombrich is determined to have us see what he
means.
But of all these missions, the most vigorous, and the
one which subsumes the others, is the quest for explanation. Gombrich is a determined explicator. He
wants to account for our responsiveness to ornament
in terms of the nature of knowledge and the process of
obtaining knowledge. He wants to explain the shift
away from elaborate ornamentation with the advent of
the machine age, which, by making mechanical reproduction possible devalued complexity. He wants to account for the heights of ornamental elaboration as
products of an evolving craft rather than as the abrupt
inventions of individuals. He even tries his hand at explaining why vertical stripes make for thinness, and
horizontal for fatness. Gombrich by no means invents
all such accounts; he often discourses on the ideas of
others, making a judicious selection. But one way or

another, his commitment to explanation in an area as
psychologically messy as the arts is striking.
In fact, this emphasis suggests an approach to understanding The Sense of Order better and appraising
its success: What sorts of explanations are offered,
and just how adequate are they? Such questions are
best pondered after a brief explanation of explanation
itself. Israel Scheffler (1963), in part of his The Anatomy of Inquiry, clarifies what an explanation ought to
accomplish. Here, only the barest sketch can be given.
In general, explanation means subsuming the event to
be explained under laws or principles. On the one
hand, the principles must be sound for a sound explanation. On the other, the principles, plus particular
conditions specific to the occasion, should deductively
imply the event. For example, the properties of phosphorus, plus conditions on the rate, force, and so on,
of striking a match on a particular occasion, imply that
the match would light, and so explain the event. In
fact, informal explanations often are elliptical, omitting
some conditions that would be required for strict deduction. Sometimes this merely signifies the absence
of premises that could be provided readily enough; at
others it signifies a fundamentally incomplete account,
one which would require serious investigation to fill out
and finally deny or affirm. Since Gombrich, of course,
does not write in the formal language of logic, the
question becomes whether his explanations, bolstered
by reasonable and ready assumptions, really imply
what they try to explain.

Gombrich's Basic Concepts
This obvious danger in a book with a title like The
Sense of Order is that no good account could be given
of so fuzzy-sounding a concept. Indeed, Gombrich
himself runs shy of stating just what sorts of order he
means:
I certainly would not venture. to define the concept of order
I use in the main title of this book, but I trust it will bring out
the feature which interests me in decorative design. The
arrangement of elements according to similarity and difference and the enjoyment of repetition and symmetry extend from the string of beads to the layout of the page in
front of the reader, and, of course, beyond to the rhythms
of movement, speech and music, not to mention the structures of society and the systems of thought. [p. x]

Instead of a definition we get a tour. However, vague
boundaries or not, Gombrich's sense of order turns
out to have a more substantial center to it than one
might at first think.
Gombrich bases his sense of order on Karl Popper's analysis of scientific inquiry, opening his introduction with a quote from the philosopher: '' It was
first in animals and children, but later also in adults,
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that I observed the immensely powerful need for regularity-the need which makes them seek for regularities'' (p. 1). In Popper's concept of inquiry, as
adopted by Gombrich, understanding is a product not
just of an order-seeking, but an order-presuming,
process, in which simple orderings are hypothesized
until disconfirmed by later experience. The world is
known, so far as it can be known, through active exploration based on hypotheses revised only as they
conflict with new data. Furthermore, it seems that organisms have to proceed in this way most of the time,
for to behave otherwise would waste too much time
and energy on needless hypothesizing or would ignore
counterevidence. A third alternative, to depend on direct knowledge of the world, is ultimately unintelligible,
no real alternative at all. Gombrich stresses, in company with contemporary psychologists interested in
perception-Uirich Neisser and Richard Gregory, for
instance-that this hypothesis-making, order-oriented
way of proceeding, and the love of order that accompanies it, must operate as much at the perceptual level
as at the level of extended intellectual inquiry.
But, paradoxically, while order is precious, so is
disorder. According to Popper, disconfirmation
strongly informs, by decisively knocking out hypotheses, that confirmation can never inform by letting pass
hypotheses which might later prove faulty. To make
the most of its capacity to presume orderliness, the inquiring organism must be predisposed to seek out
breaks in the order-to put the hypothesis at risk and
see how it fares. This stands behind what Gombrich
calls ''the most basic fact of aesthetic experience, the
fact that delight lies somewhere between boredom and
confusion" (p. 9).
Returning to the question of explanation: Are the
principles of order-hypothesizing and disconfirmationseeking, which are founded, on a thoughtful account
of the nature of knowledge, adequate to explain the
human attraction to decorative design? No doubt there
is room for debate, but at least the explanatory principles have some backing, and perhaps they do imply
an attraction to decoration. The intelligent organism,
like the most ignorant amoeba, will have to proceed
according to Popper's epistemology. We can assume
that this intelligent organism will have drives, and accompanying emotions, which move it to apply the hypothesis-making strategy perceptually and in other
ways, else it would never have become intelligent. We
can assume the intelligent organism will have the
power to arrange things and make things. So, for any
intelligent organism, some sort of patterning would be
bound to stimulate its Popperian mind simply as pattern, and, being intelligent, motivated, and capable,
the organism would make such things to enjoy them. In
short, Martians would have wallpaper, or some
unearthly equivalent, though of course we humans
might not like it at all.

Now I'm well aware that some of the assumptions
leading to this conclusion could be challenged. But the
important point here is that Popper's epistemology
does seem to imply Gombrich's sense of order, especially the responsiveness to pattern that it articulates.
If the implication is not strict, neither is it far-fetched,
and Gombrich's sense of order comes closer to satisfying the deductive requirement for explanation than at
first seems probable.
Another explanatory concept Gombrich employs is
habit. Gombrich notes that under the influence of habit
decorations have changed slowiy. Radical invention is
nonexistent, considerable invention the exception, and
the gradual evolution of decorative motifs, some of
which can be traced back for millenia, the rule.
Gombrich draws an analogy here to the role of schemata in representational art and their gradual development, as discussed in his Art and Illusion. But he notes
a contrast as well. Where the quest for realism gave
the development of those representational schemata a
definite direction, the influences on decorative schemata have been much more diffuse, and a unified ac
count of why decorations have changed as they have
becomes difficult. Nonetheless, Gombrich explores
various approaches.
Although habit extends Gombrich's explanatory armamentum, it is more a corollary than an addition to it,
for, as he points out, ''The force of habit may be said
to spring from the sense of order'' (p. 171 ). Habit
really amounts to a temporal sense of order analogous
to the spatial sense of order exhibited in wallpaper and
fluted columns for example. That today's world will be
more or less like yesterday's is the hypothesis the perceiver projects, the hypothesis that allows him to make
sense of a world which otherwise would be cluttered
and confusing. "In the study of perception," Gombrich
says, ''the force of habit makes itself felt in the greater
ease with which we take in the familiar" (p. 171 ). Presumably, in analogy to the spatial sense of order, this
hypothesis is also one which the perceiver expects will
be a little bit disconfirmed.
But does Gombrich's basic idea really explain the
role of habits? In particular, does it imply that habits
are required? Why couldn't some creature-our Martian, say-instead of relying on a repertoire of standard schemata, extrapolate the individual experiences
of the past to directly comprehend current events,
much as we, in perceiving the symmetry of a design,
extrapolate from one side of the design to the other?
The answer is practical, rather than epistemological.
While the sense of order per se arises because the organism must, logically, proceed by hypotheses, habits
arise because the organism must, in all practicality,
crystallize some of those hypotheses into habits. The
amount of computation required to match past experiences, unsorted, uncategorized, unschematized,
against current ones for a "good fit" would be un-
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manageable. Gombrich himself does not make this argument, but the basic explanatory construct again
tends to imply the phenomena it is invoked to explain-the force of habit and, in turn, the gradual evolution of decorative designs.
Perhaps here is a good place to ask: Why all this
philosophy? Why spend so many sentences examining
the abstract force of Gombrich's explanatory apparatus? The reason is that I think this clarifies Gombrich's ambition, even though I have made it more explicit than he. Gombrich is very concerned to offer
really basic explanations. He persistently tries to account for the perceptual phenomena associated with
decorative design in terms fundamental to our understanding of what it is to be an intelligent organism.
Gombrich in effect assaults the barrier between the
touchy-feely world of aesthetics and the tough business of practical intelligence, seeking to root the one
in the other, as of course other authors have done in
their own ways. Furthermore, he has not done badly
at it.

Some Points of Order
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Of course, not all characteristics of human aesthetic
response will stem from basic principles of intelligent
information processing. For one thing, the human organism seems too much an accident, too much one intelligence among possible others that might use the
same principles in different ways and prove responsive
to somewhat different patterns. As noted before, the
Martian's wallpaper needn't please us at all. Gombrich
is well aware of such limits, and emphasizes how little
one can predict about the effects on the viewer of a visual design: Bigger or smaller, chosen to be familiar or
unfamiliar, presented in times of one fashion or another, the same design may inspire radically different
reactions. Gombrich could, of course, have said that
this, too, is part of the sense of order, order over time,
within culture, and so on. But, laudably, he refrains.
The problem is that any effects of size, culture, and so
on could be accommodated just as well as any other.
This is the same as saying that the implication condition emphasized earlier fails, the sense of vacuousness we get from such explanations apparently reflecting the failure.
The existence of such general problems does not
mean that Gombrich refrains from offering explanations for particular phenomena, however. On the
contrary, he usually tries. One interesting example is
his notion of what he calls a ''field of force,'' in metaphorical, but only metaphorical, reference to the
thinking of the Gestaltists. Gombrich's field of force
concerils arrangements with a center and a decorative
border and emphasizes two effects: those things constituting a design in the border tend to lose their individual qualities and to direct attention toward the cen-
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ter; those things in the center, on the other hand, tend
to have their individual qualities emphasized. Gombrich illustrates this with numerous examples, perhaps
most charmingly by a cake decorated with cherries.
The cherries around the rim seem less flavorful morsels and more a frame. However, "The cherry in the
centre of the cake is very much a cherry'' (p. 1 56).
What about our principle of deduction? Does
Gombrich's field of force concept pass this test of explanatory adequacy? Yes, it does. The field of force
simply posits general characteristics of situations
where there are a center and a border and makes deductive predictions in individual cases like the cake.
The particular is subsumed under and implied by the
general. Put this way, the field of force is simply a lowlevel inductive generalization, much narrower than
Gombrich's overriding sense of order, and not
grounded in the basic character of an intelligent organism. But explanation it still is.
However, this will not do for Gombrich. He is determined to relate the field of force to his sense of order.
His efforts afford a good opportunity both to explore
cautiously the vertical architecture of his concepts and
to test whether the details are as sturdy as the broad
structure seems. So again, we start from the field of
force. The weakened identity of elements on a border
is in fact one example of a more general phenomenon:
the weakened identity of any repeated unit in a large
design. Gombrich discusses this phenomenon extensively, noting, for example, how the multiple faces of
Andy Warhol's Marilyn Monroe become drained of
identity. Gombrich elsewhere asserts a related notion,
that scanty apprehension of individual parts is inherent
to the nature of design. ''To expect that we read every
motif in the Alhambra as we read a book is not only unrealistic. It is contrary to the spirit of decoration, which
offers us a feast for the eye without demanding that we
should taste of every dish" {p. 1 03). Gombrich has this
to say about how the perceiver normally encounters a
design: "Faced with an array of identical objects ...
we rapidly form the preliminary hypothesis that we are
confronted with a lawful assembly, and we need only
sample the elements for redundancies by sweeping
our eye along the whole series and just taking in one
repeating component" (p. 151 ). All of this, of course,
relates to the overarching Popperian view.
Gombrich's conceptual notions certainly relate to
one another and certainly help us assemble a coherent
conception of the perceptual response to decorative
design. However, they do not quite relate to one another in an explanatory way. Consider, for example,
the connection between the field of force and the more
general vitiation of identity that comes with patterned
repetition. The latter implies the weakened individuality of the border elements in the field of force, but
does not at all imply the enhancement of the center.
Gombrich makes an effort to bridge this gap, suggest-
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ing that the enhancement of the center might follow
from the tendency of the viewer to survey the order in
the most effective way: ''In the kaleidoscope the radial
symmetry pulls the eye toward the centre from which
redundancies are most easily surveyed.'' The suggestion seems to be that Gombrich's general concepts,
plus an efficiency principle, send the eye to the center.
But are redundancies in fact most efficiently surveyed
from the center? Symmetries seem most easily sampled by skipping the center and fixating the sides alternately. To sample the redundancies of cyclic repetition
in the border design, one would best scan around the
periphery rather than making multiple trips from the
center to various points on the border. True, the entire
border is kept in peripheral view best by fixating the
center. Perhaps that peripheral view provides all the
sample the perceiver needs, but this is hard to say,
since nothing in the general concepts predicts how
much is needed. The pull toward the center referred to
by Gombrich seems real enough, but not explained by,
because not plausibly implied by, the aim of efficiently
sampling the redundant border.
For another example, consider how the vitiating effect of repetition in general relates to Gombrich's
broader point, that we need not and do not inspect
decorations for their details. Certainly, the latter
doesn't imply the former. It's not just that we don't
need to scrutinize the individual elements, but that the
display resists our doing so, even when we try. Gombrich tries to relate this resistance to his general concepts by positing a kind of rivalry: ''There must be a
conflict, or at least a tension, between the two functions of perception to which we referred at the outset,
the perception of things and the perception of order''
(p. 151 ). But Gombrich's general concepts, even with
this conflict added, still do not imply the repetition phenomenon, in particular that "thingness" would be the
loser in cases of conflict. Why ''thingness'' is the
loser, or indeed whether it always has to be, remains
uncertain. Furthermore, Gombrich's proposal of conflict is confusing in another way. He seems to forget
here what he maintains in discussing habit, that the
perception of things also is part of the perception of
order. The conflict is not between order and thing so
much as between one kind of order, design narrowly
taken, and another, familiarity.
Such difficulties arise not infrequently throughout
The Sense of Order. Many explanations are not so
readily filled out to yield plausible deductive accounts,
and sometimes, as above, we have outright inconsistencies. Although Gombrich's particular and general
concepts make a coherent overall picture, they do not
lock together into a seamless explanatory structure.
Such flaws should not be viewed as ruinous, however. On the contrary, one would hardly expect a tight
scientific account of such a complex domain. Gombrich no doubt wrote his book somewhat like a decora-

tive design, not to be scrutinized detail by detail anyway, and even incomplete explanations do valuable
service in pointing the way to further inquiry. Moreover, a more conservative and cautious Gombrich
might be one less worth having, if it costs the drive toward explanation, even though not always solid explanation, which so infuses The Sense of Order. And
Gombrich himself is frank about the limits of what he
attempts: ''I am fully aware of the fact that speculations, as yet unsupported by controlled experiments,
cannot qualify as psychological theories. But what
starts as a mere 'hunch' can sometimes be turned into
a scientific hypothesis in expert hands, and I have
been so fortunate as to see this happen with informal
suggestions I have put forward in the past'' (p. ix). So
Gombrich has issued this caveat emptor, and the
reader should take heed.

A Note of the Explanandum
The explanandum in an explanation is the thing to be
accounted for. It is, in Gombrich's The Sense of Order,
a range of phenomena concerned with decorative design. But why this explanandum? Is this where we
would like to see E. H. Gombrich investing his time and
intelligence? To put the question that way is to show
how unfair a question it is: Can an author not choose
his own work? But to address the question anyway is
to provide a little more perspective on what The Sense
of Order attempts and what it eschews.
One thing Gombrich does not attempt is an account
of aesthetic excellence in design. True, he describes
the different attitudes which have prevailed toward
such matters as functionalism, or as flatness versus
three-dimensionality. True, he takes as central to quality a provocative balance between order and disorder.
Certainly the abundant illustrations present to the
reader many lovely examples of decoration. Yet
Gombrich never tries to argue that this is superb and
that abysmal according to the logic of his concepts. If
Gombrich instructs us in the connoisseurship of decoration, it is in terms of what effects to see, not what values to apply. Some might consider this an appalling
neglect of what is really important. But, instead, it
might be considered the wisdom of explaining what
can be explained and letting the rest go hang. As
quoted earlier, Gombrich specifically acknowledges
the difficulties of any general aesthetics of design. To
this reviewer's mind, Gombrich is right: Particular differences in aesthetic quality defy any ready explanation by general principles. Rules of thumb can be
given, of course, but as explanation, they fail the test
of implication emphasized here, being too subject to
exception.
Another thing Gombrich does not attempt is a general account of the visual phenomena of abstract art.
True, Gombrich notes that the theories behind twenti-
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eth-century abstract painting draw considerably on the
debates about ornament in the nineteenth century.
True, he occasionally offers contemporary abstractions as examples of some of the effects discussed .
However, Gombrich draws a fundamental distinction
between such matters and his aim: " Remembering my
own normal reaction to decoration before I had embarked on this investigation, I was tempted to call this
book 'The Unregarded Art.' ... Painting, like speaking,
implicitly demands attention whether or not it receives
it. Decoration cannot make this demand. It normally
depends for its effect on the fluctuating attention we
can spare while we scan our surroundings'' (p. 116).
So Gombrich, no great fan of abstract painting (1963),
has chosen to complement his study of realistic representation in Art and Illusion with a study not of those
abstractions and semiabstractions that hang on the
important walls of important museums and mansions,
but of the ones that hug coffee spoons and architectural columns, the ones we take for granted.
One could regret this. I confess myself to a moment
of regret when, halfway through The Sense of Order, I
happened to visit the Fogg Art Museum at Harvard
University. On display was a Calder piece, standing on
the floor about chest high, its top a horizontal gesture
of wires and metal plates pivoting on the base. For
some reason, I found it wholly engaging. Not only did it
allow, even compel, my regard, but it departed strikingly from the perceptual armamentarium of ornamental design. There was little repetition in a narrow
sense. There was calculated asymmetry. The curvilinearities were complex, but within the reach of vision to
know them one by one and all together, a feast for the
eye where one could consume every dish, to reverse
Gombrich's expression. "This," I said to myself, "has
nothing to do with the sense of order."
But in the end there were no regrets. The old saying
about gift horses seems relevant here. E. H. Gombrich
has made us his gift, and there is no need to grumble
about how he could have done this or could have done
that. He has, in fact, chosen a neglected corner of our
vision and sought to illuminate it for us. The point is
nicely made by the way he frames his discussionwith a discussion of a picture frame. At the close of his
introduction, Gombrich has a few remarks to make
about an elaborate picture frame, circa 1700, surrounding the Madonna della Sedia by Raphael.
Gombrich says, in part, '' ... on the face of it, it seems
an extraordinarily pointless activity to expend so much
skill and labour on carving and gilding these festoons
with laurel leaves and berries, stretched between fictitious curly brackets of extraordinary elaboration,
which fasten them between shell-shaped forms'' (p.
15). 8-~t by the end of the last chapter, Gombrich is
ready to return with his readers of more informed perception to this same frame. "To the reader who has
shared this journey with me it should have looked pro-
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gressively less puzzling. We recognize in it a version of
the cartouche with four animated motifs oriented toward the field of force they enhance. They are progenies of Gorgon's heads ... "And so on. Yes, the
frame has become more meaningful, one's vision less
naive, in consequence of the rite of passage imposed
by The Sense of Order.

Note
1 This review was prepared at Project Zero , Harvard Graduate School of
Education, with support from the Spencer Foundation . The opinions expressed here do not necessarily reflect the positions or policies of supporting agencies.
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Reviewed by Carla Sarett
University of Pennsylvania
That there is an essentially metaphorical component in
many diverse realms of symbolic behavior has become
a popular, and even fashionable, concept, and thus it
seems particularly timely to consider some of the philosophical implications of the concept of metaphor itself. The publication of this latest collection of essays,
which had originally appeared as an issue of Critical
Inquiry, should serve to alert scholars to the richness
of contemporary thinking on metaphor that can generally benefit discussions of symbolic phenomena. While
much of the debate in this volume is aimed explicitly at
problems in literary communication, this approach
should not prevent a fruitful extension to related issues
in other fields. Furthermore, the concept of metaphor
is not only relevant to the objects we seek to understand but sheds considerable light on the very process
of analysis. Metaphor, then, seems doubly relevant: It
clarifies the structure of certain forms of symbolic
communication and theories about communication as
well.
Many readers, however, may encounter some difficulty in reading these essays: A good deal of knowl-

